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Abstract
In order to find an optimal and time consistent cooperative path in multicriteria multistage game the minimal sum of
relative deviations rule is introduced. Using this rule one can construct a vector-valued characteristic function that is
weakly superadditive. The sustainability of the cooperative agreement is ensured by using an imputation distribution
procedure (IDP) based approach.
We formulate the conditions an IDP should satisfy to guarantee that the core is strongly time consistent (STC).
Namely, if the imputation distribution procedure for the Shapley value satisfies the efficiency condition, the strict
balance condition and the strong irrational-behavior-proof condition, given that the Shapley value belongs to the core
of each subgame along the cooperative path, it can be used as a ”supporting imputation” which guarantees that the
whole core is STC. We discuss three payment schedules and check whether they can be used as supporting imputation
distribution procedures for the considered multicriteria game.
Keywords: Dynamic game, multiple criteria decision making, multicriteria game, strong time consistency, Shapley
value, cooperative solution
1. Introduction
The theory of multicriteria games (multiobjective games
or games with vector payoffs) lies at the intersection of
Multiple Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) and classical
game theory. It can be used to model various real-world
situations where several decision makers (or players) need
to consider several goals when choosing their strategies
(see, e.g., [41, 2, 44, 22, 5, 20, 19, 21]). As noted in [3], one
of the important trends in MCDM is “the development of
adequate dynamic MCDM approaches, taking into account
the influence of time in evolving decision processes”. This
paper deals with the dynamic properties of cooperative
behavior in n-person multicriteria multistage games with
perfect information [24, 30, 16] and hence falls in with the
specified research direction.
Different cooperative solutions for static and dynamic
games with vector payoffs were studied in [1, 11, 5, 4, 33,
34, 17, 18, 38, 36, 15]. In order to achieve and imple-
ment a long-term cooperative agreement in multicriteria
dynamic games we have to solve the following problems.
First, when players seek to achieve the maximal total vec-
tor payoff of the grand coalition, they face the problem
of choosing a unique Pareto efficient payoffs vector. In
the dynamic setting it is necessary that a specific method
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the players agreed to accept in order to select a partic-
ular Pareto efficient solution not only takes into account
the relative importance of the criteria, but also satisfies
time consistency (see, e.g., [27, 10, 30]). That is to say,
a fragment of the optimal cooperative trajectory in the
subgame should remain optimal in this subgame. For the
special case when the criteria have significantly different
importance, and all players arrange the criteria in the same
order the refined leximin algorithm introduced in [15] is a
reasonable approach to find a time consistent cooperative
path. Otherwise, say, when the players rank the criteria in
a different order or some of the criteria have approximately
equal importance, the players need to employ other appro-
priate methods to select a unique Pareto efficient solution
(see, e.g., [35, 9]). In this paper, we use the rule of minimal
sum of relative deviations (MSRD) from the ideal payoffs
vector [23] to find a unique optimal cooperative path, and
prove its time consistency.
After choosing the cooperative trajectory it is necessary
to construct a vector-valued characteristic function. To
this end, we suggest to use the ζ-characteristic function
introduced in [7] and the MSRD rule in order to select a
particular Pareto efficient solution for the auxiliary vector
optimization problems. We assume that the cooperative
multicriteria game satisfies the component-wise transfer-
able utility property, i.e., we allow the payoff to be trans-
ferred between the players within the same criterion k.
Note that the main measurable criteria used in multicri-
teria resource management problems (for instance, water
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supply amount, cost of water purification, the quota for
the use of a common resource, the quota for emissions,
profit from the use of a common resource, etc.) satisfy the
required transferable utility property. To determine the
optimal payoff allocation we explore the vector analogues
of two well known cooperative solutions, namely the core
and the Shapley value [1, 34, 33].
Lastly, to guarantee the sustainability of the achieved
long-term cooperative agreement one needs to design a
consistent imputation distribution procedure or a payment
schedule [28, 31, 30, 37] that should satisfy a set of use-
ful properties. The detailed review of dynamic properties
the IDP may satisfy for multistage multicriteria games is
presented in [17, 18, 15]. In this paper we mainly focus on
the efficiency constraint and the strict balance condition as
well as strong time consistency (STC) [30, 29, 6, 32, 39] and
strong irrational-behavior-proofness (IBP) [45] for individ-
ual players and coalitions. Although the criteria are mea-
sured in different units, we use the word payment with re-
spect to every criterion k for the sake of simplicity and uni-
formity. It is worth noting that the IDP-based approach
proved to be an effective method to implement long-term
cooperative agreement in single-criterion dynamic games
(see, e.g., [28, 30, 31, 37]).
In the paper, we establish the exact set of properties that
an imputation distribution procedure has to satisfy in or-
der to guarantee the strong time consistency of the core.
Namely, if the Shapley value (or any other single-valued
cooperative solution) belongs to the core at every sub-
game along the optimal cooperative path, and the payment
schedule satisfies the efficiency, strict balance and strong
irrational-behavior-proof conditions, the core in multicri-
teria multistage game satisfies STC if the Shapley value
is used as the supporting imputation. We consider three
payment schedules which satisfy the efficiency and strict
balance condition and check the STC of the core for given
3-person 3-criteria multistage game.
There are a number of possible applications of the pro-
posed method. In particular, it can be used when ana-
lyzing water resources management problems which are
often modeled as dynamic MCDM problems (see [20] for
the review of water resources conflict resolution models).
For instance, in [21], a multicriteria game theoretic ap-
proach is applied to analyze California’s Sacramento-San
Joaquin Delta problem [19], and “the most likely” Pareto
efficient cooperative solution (building a tunnel or pipeline
to move water around the Delta) is proposed. In this pa-
per we examine an alternative approach to select optimal
cooperative solution, and provide a step-by-step method
to implement the long-term cooperative agreement which
guarantees the sustainability of cooperation.
The contribution of this paper is twofold:
- we suggest the minimal sum of relative deviations rule
as a specific method to find an optimal and time consistent
cooperative trajectory for multicriteria multistage game
and to construct a vector-valued characteristic function.
This method for sectioning a unique Pareto efficient solu-
tion differs from the one used in [15] and is applicable to
a broader class of MCDM problems. Note that the con-
structed ζ-characteristic function is proved to satisfy weak
superadditivity property.
- we provide a general characterization of the strong time
consistent core in multicriteria multistage games which al-
lows the players to use any appropriate imputation distri-
bution procedure along the cooperative trajectory. This is
a generalization of the Propositon 3, proved in [15] for the
partial case of the so-called incremental payment schedule.
We propose an example to clarify how the players can se-
lect an appropriate imputation distribution procedure on
the base of their properties analysis.
The paper is organized as follows: The class of finite
multistage r-criteria games in extensive form with perfect
information is formalized in Section 2. In Section 3.1, we
prove that the set of all Pareto efficient strategy profiles
does not satisfy the STC property. In Section 3.2, the
minimal sum of relative deviations rule for choosing opti-
mal cooperative trajectory is formalized and the resulting
Pareto optimal solution is proved to be time consistent. A
vector-valued ζ-characteristic function for a multicriteria
cooperative game based on the minimal sum of relative
deviations rule is constructed and proved to be weakly su-
peradditive in Section 4. In Section 5.1, we specify which
properties the payment schedule should satisfy to guaran-
tee sustainable cooperation in dynamic multicriteria game.
The general conditions for STC of the core are proved in
Section 5.2. We examine an illustrative example and com-
pare three different payment schedules in Section 6. Fi-
nally, Section 7 presents a brief conclusion.
2. Multistage multicriteria game with perfect in-
formation
We consider a finite multistage multicriteria game (game
in extensive form) with perfect information comprised by
the following ingredients (see [12, 30, 16, 17] for details):
• N = {1, ..., n} is the set of all players.
• K is the (rooted) game tree with the root x0 and the
set of all nodes P .
• S(x) is the set of all direct successors of the node
x, and S−1(x) denotes the unique predecessor of the
node x 6= x0 such that x ∈ S(S−1(x)).
• Pi is the set of all decision nodes of the i-th player
(at these nodes the player i chooses the following
node), Pi ∩ Pj = ∅, for all i, j ∈ N , i 6= j, and
Pn+1 = {zj}mj=1 denotes the set of all terminal nodes
(final positions), S(zj) = ∅ ∀zj ∈ Pn+1. It holds that
∪n+1i=1 Pi = P .
• ω = (x0, . . . , xt−1, xt, . . . , xT ) is the path (or the tra-
jectory) in the game tree, xt−1 = S−1(xt), 1 6 t 6 T ;
2
xT = z
j ∈ Pn+1; where index t in xt denotes the or-
dinal number of this node in the path ω (in discrete
time).
• hi(x) = (hi/1(x), . . . , hi/r(x)) is the r-component vec-
tor payoff of the player i computed at the node x ∈
P\{x0}. We assume that for all i ∈ N , k = 1, ..., r,
and x ∈ P\{x0} the respective payoffs are positive,
i.e., hi/k(x) > 0.
In the following, we will write Γx0 when referring to the
multistage multicriteria game defined above. Since we
deal with the multistage games with perfect information
we consider only the class of players’ pure strategies (see
[12, 24, 30] for details). The pure strategy ui(·) of the i-th
player is a function that uniquely determines for each node
x ∈ Pi the next node ui(x) ∈ S(x) that the player i has
to choose at x. Denote by Ui the set of all possible pure
strategies of the player i , and U =
∏
i∈N Ui. Every pure
strategy profile u = (u1, ..., un) ∈ U generates the unique
path ω(u) = (x0, x1(u), . . . , xt(u), xt+1(u), . . . , xT (u)),
where xt+1 = uj(xt) ∈ S(xt) if xt ∈ Pj , 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Furthermore, each path ω(u) generates a collection of
the vector payoffs of all players. We will write
Hi(u) = (Hi|1(u), . . . ,Hi|r(u)) =
T∑
τ=1
hi(xτ (u)), (1)
to denote the value of the i-th player’s vector payoff
function which corresponds to the strategy profile u =
(u1, ..., un).
Following [12, 30], at every intermediate node xt ∈
P\Pn+1 in the game Γx0 one can define a subgame Γxt
with the subgame treeKxt and the subroot xt and a factor-
game ΓD with the factor-game tree KD = {xt}∪(K\Kxt).
Decomposition of the original multistage game Γx0 at the
intermediate node xt onto the subgame Γ
xt and the factor-
game ΓD further induces the corresponding decomposition
of (pure and mixed) strategies (see [12, 30] for detailes).
Denote by P xti (P
D
i ), i = 1, . . . , n, the restriction of the
set Pi onto the subgame tree K
xt(KD), and let uxti (u
D
i )
denote the corresponding restriction of the i-th player’s
pure strategy ui(·) in Γx0 to P xti (PDi ). The strategy profile
uxt = (uxt1 , . . . , u
xt
n ) in the subgame generates the path
(trajectory) ωxt(uxt) = (xt, xt+1(u
xt), . . . , xT (u
xt)) and,
therefore, a collection of all the players’ vector payoffs in
this subgame. Similarly to (1), we will denote by
Hxti (u
xt) = h˜xti (ω
xt(uxt)) =
T∑
τ=t+1
hi(xτ (u
xt)), (2)
the value of the i-th player’s vector payoff function in Γxt ,
and by Uxti the set of all possible i-th player’s pure strate-
gies in the subgame Γxt , Uxt =
∏
i∈N U
xt
i . Moreover,
Hi(u) =
t∑
τ=1
hi(xτ (u)) +
T∑
τ=t+1
hi(xτ (u
xt)) =
=h˜i(ω
xt(u)) + h˜xti (ω
xt(uxt)),
(3)
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Figure 1: The bicriteria game tree
where ωxt(u) = (x0, x1, . . . , xt−1, xt) denotes a fragment
of path ω(u) implemented before the start of the subgame
Γxt .
Note that, since Pi = P
xt
i ∪PDi , we can compose the i-th
player’s pure strategy Wi = (u
D
i , v
xt
i ) ∈ Ui in the original
game Γx0 from her strategies vxti ∈ Uxti and uDi ∈ UDi in
the subgame Γxt and the factor-game ΓD [12, 30].
To clarify the notation we consider the following bicri-
teria game in extensive form.
Example 1. A 3-player Bicriteria Multistage
Game.
Let n = 3, r = 2, P1 = {x0}, P2 = {x1}, P3 = {x2},
P4 = {x3, x4, x5, x6}, and
h(xt) =
(
h1/1(xt) h2/1(xt) h3/1(xt)
h1/2(xt) h2/2(xt) h3/2(xt)
)
, t 6= 0.
The game tree K is presented in Fig. 1. Note that the
payoff h(xt) at node xt, t 6= 0, is given by a matrix whose
rows correspond to the criteria, and the columns corre-
spond to the players.
Consider the following strategies ui(·) in Γx0 :
u1(x0) = x1, u2(x1) = x2, u3(x2) = x3.
Strategy profile u = (u1, u2, u3) generates the path
ω(u) = (x0, x1, x2, x3) and the corresponding collection
of the players’ vector payoffs
H1(u) = H2(u) =
(
12
12
)
,
H3(u) =
(
2
4
)
+
(
2
3
)
+
(
8
3
)
=
(
12
10
)
.
There are two subgames Γx1 and Γx2 along the tra-
jectory ω(u). The profile of strategies ux12 (x1) = x2,
ux13 (x2) = x3 generates the path ω
x1(ux1) = (x1, x2, x3)
in the subgame Γx1 while ωx1(u) = (x0, x1). The formulae
(2) and (3) for player 3 take the form
Hx13 (u
x1) = h˜x13 (ω
x1(ux1)) =
3∑
τ=2
h3(xτ (u
x1)) =
=
(
2
3
)
+
(
8
3
)
=
(
10
6
)
,
3
H3(u) = h˜3(ω
x1(u)) + h˜x13 (ω
x1(ux1)) =
=
(
2
4
)
+
(
10
6
)
=
(
12
10
)
.
We will return to this example in Section 3 when exam-
ining the strong time consistency property.
Let a, b ∈ Rm and k = 1, . . . ,m. To compare the vectors
we use the following notations for vector preferences:
a = b, if ak > bk,∀k = 1, ...,m,
a > b, if ak > bk,∀k = 1, ...,m,
a ≥ b, if a = b and a 6= b.
The last inequality implies that the vector b is Pareto dom-
inated by vector a (and hence b is called ”inefficient”).
When the players agree to cooperate in the game
Γx0 , first they have to maximize the total payoffs vector∑n
i=1Hi(u) w.r.t. the binary relation ≥ . Let PO(Γx0) be
the set of all Pareto efficient pure strategy profiles from U ,
i.e.:
u ∈ PO(Γx0) if @ v ∈ U :
∑
i∈N
Hi(v) ≥
∑
i∈N
Hi(u). (4)
In general, the nonempty set PO(Γx0) consists of multi-
ple strategy profiles (see, e.g., [35, 30]), and the problem
of choosing a particular Pareto efficient strategy profile
arises.
3. Pareto optimal solution
3.1. Strong time consistency property
In [15], we proved that the set PO(Γx0) of all Pareto
efficient pure strategy profiles for a multistage multicri-
teria game Γx0 satisfies the time consistency property.
This implies that if the players choose certain Pareto
optimal strategy profile u that generates the trajectory
ω(u) = (x0, x1(u), . . . , xt(u), xt+1(u), . . . , xT (u)), then in
any subgame Γxt evolving along the optimal trajectory
ω(u), the restrictions of the original strategies ui to the
subgame form a Pareto efficient strategy profile in this
subgame.
This property can be strengthened in order to allow for
deviations from the chosen optimal strategy. This exten-
sion is referred to as strong time consistency.
Definition 1. [30] The set PO(Γx0) is called strongly
time consistent if ∀u ∈ PO(Γx0), ∀Γxt , xt ∈ ω(u), and for
every Pareto efficient strategy profile W xt ∈ PO(Γxt) in
the subgame the following inclusion holds:
(uD,W xt) = ((uD1 ,W
xt
1 ), . . . , (u
D
n ,W
xt
n )) ∈ PO(Γx0). (5)
This property ensures the compatibility of locally opti-
mal behavior (W xt) in the subgame with initial optimality
requirements [28, 30, 29, 13, 14]. That is, at any interme-
diate state xt the players can ”switch” to another strategy
profile W xt that is Pareto efficient in the current subgame
Γxt . The STC guarantees that the compound behavior
obtained as a result of such switching still satisfies Pareto
efficiency in the original game.
However, as the following example demonstrates, a
Pareto optimal strategy profile may not necessarily be
strongly time consistent.
Example 1 (Continued).
Consider the following strategies in Γx0 :
u1(x0) = x1, u2(x1) = x2, u3(x2) = x3;∑
i∈N
Hi(u) =
(
36
34
)
;
v1(x0) = x4, v2(x1) = x2, v3(x2) = x3;∑
i∈N
Hi(v) =
(
32
39
)
.
Strategy profile u ∈ PO(Γx0) generates the trajec-
tory ω(u) = (x0, x1, x2, x3). The subgame Γ
x1 has two
Pareto optimal strategy profiles ux1 and W x1(W x12 (x1) =
x2,W
x1
3 (x2) = x6):
∑
i∈N
Hx1i (u
x1) =
(
30
18
)
,
∑
i∈N
Hx1i (W
x1) =
(
26
21
)
.
The compound strategy profile (uD,W x1) in the original
game Γx0 generates the trajectory
λ(uD,W x1) =(x0, x1(u), x2(W
x1), x6(W
x1)) =
=(x0, x1, x2, x6),
and the corresponding total payoff vector∑
i∈N
Hi(u
D,W x1) =
(
32
37
)
which is not Pareto optimal in Γx0 . Hence, the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 1. The set PO(Γx0) in multicriteria multi-
stage game Γx0 does not satisfy the strong time consistency
property.
3.2. The Minimal Sum of Relative Deviations rule
To make a precise prediction on the players behavior in
multicriteria game one need to specify a rule γ which all
the players should use in order to select the time consistent
cooperative path ω¯ = ω(u¯) and the corresponding Pareto
efficient strategy profile u¯ ∈ PO(Γx0). Now we are ready
to formally introduce such a specific rule which is appli-
cable for a wide class of multicriteria games with positive
payoffs. We will refer to this rule as the minimal sum of
relative deviations (MSRD) rule.
Denote by HN |k(u) =
∑
i∈N
Hi|k(u) the sum of all play-
ers’ payoffs w.r.t. the criterion k, hN |k(xτ ) =
∑
i∈N
hi|k(xτ ),
4
xτ ∈ P \ {x0}. Let H∗k = max
u∈U
HN |k(u). The vector
(H∗1 , . . . ,H
∗
r ) can be interpreted as the vector of ideal pay-
offs for the grand coalition N (see, e.g., [23, 35, 30, 43]).
Definition 2. According to the MSRD rule the players
have to select a Pareto efficient pure strategy profile u
which minimizes the sum of relative deviations w.r.t. each
criterion from ideal payoffs vector H∗. Namely,
min
v∈U
r∑
k=1
H∗k −HN |k(v)
H∗k
=
r∑
k=1
H∗k −HN |k(u)
H∗k
,
or
u ∈ arg max
v∈U
r∑
k=1
1
H∗k
·HN |k(v) =
= arg max
v∈U
r∑
k=1
µk ·HN |k(v),
(6)
where µk =
1
H∗k
> 0, k = 1, . . . , r.
Denote by PO(Γx0) the nonempty set of strategy pro-
files u ∈ U which satisfy (6). If |{ω(u), u ∈ PO(Γx0)} | =
1, let the players choose any strategy profile u ∈ PO(Γx0),
since any such strategy profile generates the same cooper-
ative path ω¯ = ω(u¯) = (x¯0, x¯1, . . . , x¯T ), where x¯0 = x0.
Otherwise note that every trajectory ωl ∈ {ω(u), u ∈
PO(Γx0)}, l = 1, . . . , m¯; m¯ > 1 leads to some terminal
node xTl = z
j ∈ Pn+1. Let the players choose terminal
node xTl = z
j with minimal number j, the corresponding
path ω¯ = ω(u¯) = (x¯0, . . . , z
j) from {ω(u), u ∈ PO(Γx0)}
with terminal node zj be the cooperative trajectory (path),
and the strategy profile u¯ ∈ PO(Γx0) such that ω(u¯) = ω¯
be the optimal cooperative strategy profile.
Remark 1. Strictly speaking, the MSRD rule defined
above determines uniquely only the optimal cooperative
trajectory ω¯ but not the optimal strategy profile. The
reason for this is that in the definition of a pure strategy
for extensive game there is a certain redundancy (since
the player i’s behavior at some nodes may not affect the
outcome of the game, see [12, 24, 30] for details). However
the strategy profile u¯ chosen by the MSRD rule uniquely
determines the players’ behaviour at all nodes x¯t ∈ ω¯.
Remark 2. One can readily check that u ∈ PO(Γx0) if
u satisfies (6).
We will suppose in this paper that all the players have
agreed to employ the minimal sum of relative deviations
rule in order to find the cooperative path ω¯ = ω(u¯) =
(x¯0, . . . , x¯T ) generated by the cooperative strategy profile
u¯ ∈ PO(Γx0).
Denote by
Maxµ
u∈U
∑
i∈N
Hi(u) =
∑
i∈N
Hi(u¯) (7)
the maximal (namely in the sense of minimal sum of rela-
tive deviations rule) total vector payoff. In addition, sup-
pose that at every subgame Γx¯t , x¯t ∈ ω¯, players choose
the strategy profile ux¯t ∈ U x¯t such that
ux¯t ∈ arg max
vx¯t∈U x¯t
r∑
k=1
µk ·H x¯tN |k(vx¯t), (8)
where the coefficients µk =
1
H∗k
are the same as in (6).
We will write PO(Γx¯t) to denote the set of all strat-
egy profiles ux¯t ∈ U x¯t that satisfy (8). If strategy profiles
from PO(Γx¯t) generate different trajectories in Γx¯t , i.e.,
|{ωx¯t(ux¯t), ux¯t ∈ PO(Γx¯t)}| ≥ 2, the players choose the
cooperative path ω¯x¯t in the subgame using the same ap-
proach as in the original game Γx0 (minimal number j of
the terminal node zj).
Proposition 2. The particular Pareto efficient solution
based on the MSRD rule is time consistent. Namely, sup-
pose that u¯ ∈ U satisfies (6), and ω¯ = ω(u¯) = (x¯0, . . . , x¯T )
is the cooperative path in Γx0 . Then for each subgame
Γx¯t , x¯t ∈ ω¯ along the optimal cooperative path, it holds
that
u¯x¯t = (u¯x¯t1 , . . . , u¯
x¯t
n ) ∈ arg max
ux¯t∈U x¯t
r∑
k=1
µk ·H x¯tN |k(ux¯t), (9)
while ω¯x¯t = (x¯t, x¯t+1, . . . , x¯T ) is the corresponding coop-
erative path in the subgame Γx¯t .
Proof. Suppose that (9) does not hold, i.e., there exists
ux¯t ∈ U x¯t such that
r∑
k=1
µk ·H x¯tN |k(u¯x¯t) <
r∑
k=1
µk ·H x¯tN |k(ux¯t). (10)
Let λx¯t = (x¯t, xt+1(u
x¯t), . . . , xΛ(u
x¯t)) be the trajectory in
the subgame Γx¯t generated by ux¯t . Then (10) takes the
form
r∑
k=1
µk ·
T∑
τ=t+1
hN |k(x¯τ ) <
r∑
k=1
µk ·
Λ∑
τ=t+1
hN |k(xτ (ux¯t)). (11)
Let, furthermore, ui = (u¯
D
i , u
x¯t
i ) denote the “com-
pound” strategy in Γx0 . Then u = (u1, . . . , un)
generates the trajectory λ = ω¯x¯t ∪ λx¯t =
(x¯0, . . . , x¯t, xt+1(u
x¯t), . . . , xΛ(u
x¯t)) in Γx0 .
Adding
r∑
k=1
µk
t∑
τ=1
hN |k(x¯τ ) to both sides of (11) and
taking into account (3) we get
r∑
k=1
µk ·HN |k(u¯) <
r∑
k=1
µk ·HN |k(u)
for some u ∈ U . The last inequalitiy contradicts the con-
dition u¯ ∈ PO(Γx0), hence (9) is valid.
Arguing in a similar way (for the case when
|{ωx¯t(ux¯t), ux¯t ∈ PO(Γx¯t)}| > 1) one can verify that
ω¯x¯t = (x¯t, . . . , x¯T ) — a fragment of the optimal path w¯,
starting at x¯t — remains the optimal cooperative path in
the subgame Γx¯t . 2
5
4. Constructing a characteristic function for mul-
ticriteria game
To design a vector-valued characteristic function for
multistage multicriteria game Γx0 we employ the method
described in [7]. The corresponding ζ-characteristic func-
tion is relatively friendly computable and is proved to sat-
isfy the superadditivity property for (single-criterion) co-
operative differential n-person games. This approach im-
plies the following two-stage scheme: first the players se-
lect the optimal cooperative strategy profile u¯ ∈ PO(Γx0)
using MSRD rule. Then, we assume that all players from
S use the optimal cooperative strategies u¯j , while the
other players (from N\S) seek to minimize (in the sense
of MSRD rule) the total payoffs vector of the players from
coalition S:
V (S) =

0¯ ∈ Rr, S = ∅,
Minµ
uj ,j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Hi(u¯S , uN\S), S ⊂ N,
Maxµ
u∈U
∑
i∈N
Hi(u), S = N.
(12)
Namely, the players from N \ S solve the following opti-
mization problem:
min
uj ,j∈N\S
r∑
k=1
µk ·
∑
i∈S
Hi|k(u¯S , uN\S) =
=
r∑
k=1
µk ·
∑
i∈S
Hi|k(u¯S , uN\S). (13)
It is worth noting that coefficients µk in (13) are the same
as in (6).
Again, if for all uN\S satisfying (13) |ω(u¯S , uN\S)| =
1, the players from N \ S can choose any uN\S meeting
(13). Otherwise, they are expected to choose the path
ω(u¯S , uN\S) whose terminal node z
j has minimal number
j, and corresponding bundle of strategies (uj)j∈N\S . Let
Minµ
uj ,j∈N\S
∑
i∈S
Hi(u¯S , uN\S) =
∑
i∈S
Hi(u¯S , uN\S)
denote the minimal (in the sense of the MSRD rule) total
vector payoff of the coalition S.
Definition 3. The vector-valued characteristic function
V (S) in multicriteria game Γ satisfies weak superadditivity
property if for all S1, S2 ⊆ N with S1∩S2 = ∅ the following
vector inequality
V (S1 ∪ S2) ≤ V (S1) + V (S2) (14)
does not hold.
Proposition 3. The vector-valued characteristic function
(12) is weakly superadditive.
Proof. Consider proper coalitions S1, S2 ⊂ N , S1 ∩ S2 =
∅, S = S1 ∪ S2 ⊂ N . Let
Minµ
uj ,j∈N\S1
∑
i∈S1
Hi(u¯S1 , uN\S1) =
∑
i∈S1
Hi(u¯S1 , u
′
N\S1),
Minµ
uj ,j∈N\S2
∑
i∈S2
Hi(u¯S2 , uN\S2) =
∑
i∈S2
Hi(u¯S2 , u
′′
N\S2).
Then for all possible uN\S1 ⊂ UN\S1 and uN\S2 ⊂ UN\S2
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S1
Hi|k(u¯S1 , u
′
N\S1) ≤
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S1
Hi|k(u¯S1 , uN\S1),
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S2
Hi|k(u¯S2 , u
′′
N\S2) ≤
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S2
Hi|k(u¯S2 , uN\S2).
(15)
Suppose that inequality (14) is valid, i.e.∑
i∈S
Hi|k(u¯S , uN\S) ≤
∑
i∈S1
Hi|k(u¯S1 , u
′
N\S1)+
+
∑
i∈S2
Hi|k(u¯S2 , u
′′
N\S2), k = 1, . . . , r;
(16)
and at least one inequality from (16) is strict.
If we multiply each inequality from (16) by µk > 0 and
then sum up all the inequalities, we get
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S
Hi|k(u¯S , uN\S) =
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S1
Hi|k(u¯S1 , u¯S2 , uN\S)+
+
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S2
Hi|k(u¯S1 , u¯S2 , uN\S) <
<
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S1
Hi|k(u¯S1 , u
′
N\S1)+
r∑
k=1
µk
∑
i∈S2
Hi|k(u¯S2 , u
′′
N\S2).
The last inequality contradicts system (15).
Hence, (14) does not hold, and V (S) is weakly superaddi-
tive.
Obviously, for the coalition S = ∅ and S = N the weak
superadditivity property holds trivially. 2
5. Long-term implementation of the cooperative
solution
5.1. The imputation distribution procedure and its proper-
ties
An imputation distribution procedure (or payment
schedule) is known to be a useful method to implement a
long-term cooperative agreement in a dynamic game (see,
e.g., [28, 31, 30, 37, 17, 18, 8]). Below, we introduce a num-
ber of properties that can be used to characterize an im-
putation distribution procedure. For certainty, we will for-
mulate these properties for the Shapley value and later on
for the core, although they can be readily generalized for
an arbitrary imputation (see, for instance, [23, 24, 30, 17])
from a cooperative solution.
The core and the Shapley value were extended to coop-
erative multicriteria games in [1, 4, 33] and [34]. Denote
by Γx0(N,V x0) a multicriteria game Γx0 with the vector-
valued characteristic function V x0 defined by (12).
Definition 4. [40] The Shapley value of Γx0(N,V x0) is a
vector ϕx0 which is defined for every player i ∈ N as
ϕx0i =
∑
S⊂N,i∈S
(n− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
n!
(V x0(S)− V x0(S \ {i})).
(17)
Note that the Shapley value for a cooperative multi-
criteria game is proved to satisfy the so-called efficiency
property [40, 34], i.e.:
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n∑
i=1
ϕx0i = V
x0(N) =
T∑
τ=1
n∑
i=1
hi(x¯τ ). (18)
However, if a vector-valued characteristic function for
multicriteria game does not satisfy the strong (component-
wise) superadditivity property, the Shapley value may not
necessarily satisfy the so-called individual rationality con-
straint: ϕx0i = V x0({i}).
For every x¯t ∈ ω¯(u¯), denote by Γx¯t(N,V x¯t), t = 0, . . . ,
T −1, a subgame along the cooperative path with the sub-
game characteristic function V x¯t which can be computed
for this subgame using the same approach as in (12). Note
that
V x¯t(N) =
T∑
τ=t+1
∑
i∈N
hi(x¯τ ). (19)
Let (ϕx¯ti )i∈N denote the Shapley value for the subgame
Γx¯t(N,V x¯τ ). Denote by β = {βi/k(x¯τ )}, i = 1, . . . , n;
k = 1, . . . , r; τ = 1, . . . , T the IDP (or the payment sched-
ule) [28, 31, 30, 17, 37]. The payment schedule based ap-
proach means that all the players have agreed to allocate
(according to some specific rule called IDP) the total coop-
erative vector payoff
∑
i∈N Hi(u¯) = V
x0(N) between the
players along the cooperative path ω¯(u¯). Then βi/k(x¯τ )
denotes the actual current payment that the i-th player
receives at node x¯τ w.r.t. criterion k (instead of hi/k(x¯τ ))
when the players apply the imputation distribution proce-
dure β.
If at the initial time each player is satisfied with the re-
spective share ϕx0i of the total payoff V
x0(N), then an ap-
propriate payment schedule can be used to keep the player
interested in cooperation at any intermediate time, i.e., in
any subgame Γxt .
Definition 5. [17] The imputation distribution proce-
dure β = {βi/k(xt)} satisfies the efficiency condition if
T∑
t=1
βi(x¯t) = ϕ
x0
i , i = 1, . . . , n. (20)
Equation (20) means that the sum of the player i’s ac-
tual current payments along the optimal cooperative path
equals to the total amount to be obtained by the player i
according to the cooperative solution. Then the payment
schedule for every player can be reasonably interpreted as
a rule for the step-by-step allocation of the player i’s op-
timal payoff.
Definition 6. The imputation distribution procedure
β satisfies the strict balance condition if ∀t = 1, .., T ;∀k =
1, ..., r
t∑
τ=1
n∑
i=1
βi/k(x¯τ ) =
t∑
τ=1
n∑
i=1
hi/k(x¯τ ). (21)
This condition ensures that at any intermediate state x¯t
along the optimal trajectory the players have collected ex-
actly the amount of payments that is needed to implement
the procedure β.
The next useful dynamic property of a payment schedule
— the IBP condition, introduced in [45] — was extended
to multicriteria cooperative games in [17, 15] .
Definition 7. [17] The imputation distribution pro-
cedure β = {βi/k(x¯t)}, i = 1, . . . , n; t = 1, . . . , T
in Γx0(N,V x0) satisfies the strong (or component-wise)
irrational-behavior-proof (IBP) condition for individual
players, if for all i ∈ N and for any t = 1, . . . , T − 1 it
holds that:
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) + V
x¯t({i}) = V x0({i}). (22)
Vector inequality (22) implies that every player has a
reasonable incentive to cooperate (at least until the inter-
mediate node x¯t will be reached) even if he anticipates that
the cooperation can be destroyed at the node x¯t because
of the ”irrational behavior” of some other players.
Definition 8. [15] The imputation distribution proce-
dure β satisfies the strong irrational-behavior-proof (IBP)
condition (for coalitions) if ∀ S ⊂ N , |S| > 1, for any
t = 1, . . . , T − 1 it holds that:
∑
i∈S
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) + V
x¯t(S) = V x0(S). (23)
Two other advantageous properties of payment sched-
ules in multicriteria game – time consistency and non-
negativity – were investigated in [17, 18].
Definition 9. [17] The imputation distribution proce-
dure β = {βi/k(x¯t)} satisfies the time consistency property
if
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) + ϕ
x¯t
i = ϕ
x0
i ∀t = 1, . . . , T − 1, i ∈ N.
This constraint means that the total payment received by
the i-th player along the cooperative path before entering
the intermediate node x¯t plus the i-th component of the
subgame Shapley value is equal to the player i’s optimal
payoff to be obtained in the original game.
Definition 10. The imputation distribution procedure
β satisfies the non-negativity constraint if
βi/k(x¯t) > 0, i = 1, . . . , n; k = 1, . . . , r; t = 1, . . . , T.
We note that there could be different payment schedules
that may or may not satisfy the properties listed above.
Below we consider three payment schedules and discuss
their properties.
The first one, called the incremental imputation distri-
bution procedure is formulated as follows, [28, 17]:
βi(x¯t) = ϕ
x¯t−1
i − ϕx¯ti , t = 1, . . . , T − 1;
βi(x¯T ) = ϕ
x¯T−1
i .
(24)
This payment schedule was studied extensively for dif-
ferent classes of single-criterion dynamic games (see for
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instance [30]). The incremental payment schedule is de-
signed to satisfy time consistency, but in general this
IDP does not satisfy the non-negativity condition (two
approaches how to overcome this disadvantage were de-
scribed in [17, 8]).
The proportional imputation distribution procedure is
defined as
βi/k(x¯t) =
∑n
i=1 hi/k(x¯t)
V x0k (N)
· ϕx¯0i/k, t = 1, . . . , T. (25)
This payment schedule implies the proportional allocation
of the total current vector payoff at every node along the
optimal cooperative trajectory. The proportional IDP ob-
viously satisfies the non-negativity constraint for multicri-
teria games with positive payoffs but does not satisfy time
consistency (see, e.g., [28, 17]).
Finally, we consider a novel payment schedule as de-
scribed below.
Definition 11. The V-incremental payment schedule is
defined as follows
βi(x¯t) = V
x¯t−1({i})− V x¯t({i})+
+
1
n
(
V x¯t−1(N)− ∑
i∈N
V x¯t−1({i})
)
−
− 1
n
(
V x¯t(N)− ∑
i∈N
V x¯t({i})
)
, t = 1, . . . , T − 1;
βi(x¯T ) = ϕ
x0
i −
T−1∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ).
(26)
This payment schedule is neither non-negative nor time
consistent in general, but it is the most flexible one as the
players may postpone the choice of a particular supporting
imputation from the core up to the final stage of a game.
To conclude, we note that all these payment schedules
always satisfy the efficiency (20) and the strict balance
conditions (21).
5.2. Choice of supporting imputation for the core
In the following we will consider the core as the multiple
cooperative solution.
Definition 12. [33] The core C(V x0) of the coopera-
tive game Γx0(N,V x0) is a set of all imputations α =
(α1, . . . , αn) satisfying the inequalities∑
i∈S
αi = αS = V x0(S), ∀S ⊂ N. (27)
Likewise, for every subgame Γx¯t(N,V x¯t), t = 1, . . . , T − 1
we denote by C(V x¯t) the core of this subgame.
Let A[r×n] denote the set of all matrices with real com-
ponents which contain r lines and n columns, a ∈ A[r×n],
B ⊂ A[r × n]. We employ the notation a ⊕ B = {a + b :
b ∈ B} to define the strong time consistency of the whole
core [6, 15].
Definition 13. [6] The core C(V x0) satisfies the strong
time consistency property in the game Γx0(N,V x0) if
1. C(V x¯t) 6= ∅ for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
2. There exists an imputation α¯ ∈ C(V x0) and impu-
tation distribution procedure β = {βi/k(x¯t)}, t =
1, . . . , T , such that
∑T
t=1 βi(x¯t) = α¯i, i = 1, . . . , n,
and
C(V x0) ⊃
t∑
τ=1
β(x¯τ )⊕C(V x¯t), t = 1, . . . , T−1. (28)
Definition 14. The vector α¯ from the core C(V x0)
and the imputation distribution procedure β = {βi/k(xt)}
which provide condition (28) are called the supporting
imputation and the supporting IDP, respectively.
If the core C(V x0) satisfies the STC it is possible to
find the supporting imputation α¯ inside the core and to
redistribute it over time using payment schedule β such
that any deviation from this supporting solution to any
other imputation from the subgame core C(V x¯t) will result
to the vector of payoffs that is also contained in the core
C(V x0).
Proposition 4. Let for every subgame Γx¯t(N,V x¯t),
t = 0, . . . , T − 1 formed along the cooperative path ω¯ the
core C(V x¯t) be non-empty and contain the Shapley value
ϕx¯t . Let a payment schedule β = {βi/k(xt)} for Shap-
ley value satisfy the efficiency condition (20), the strict
balance condition (21), and the strong IBP conditions for
individual players (22) and for coalitions(23).
Then the whole core C(V x0) in the original game
Γ(N,V x0) satisfies the STC while the Shapley value ϕx0i
and payment schedule β = {βi/k(xt)} are used as a sup-
porting imputation α¯ and supporting imputation distribu-
tion procedure, respectively.
Proof. To verify (28) let us select an arbitrary t ∈
{1, . . . , T − 1} and any imputation αt ∈ C(V x¯t) from
the subgame Γx¯t(N,V x¯t) core . Denote by αˆi =∑t
τ=1 βi(x¯τ ) + α
t
i the resulting vector of the players’ pay-
offs in Γ(N,V x0).
We have to prove that αˆ satisfies inequalities (27), i.e.
that (αˆ1, . . . , αˆn) ∈ C(V x0).
Using the strict balance condition (21), (18) and (19)
we obtain
∑
i∈N
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) =
∑
i∈N
T∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ )−
∑
i∈N
T∑
τ=t+1
βi(x¯τ ) =
=
∑
i∈N
T∑
τ=1
hi(x¯τ )−
∑
i∈N
T∑
τ=t+1
hi(x¯τ ) = V
x0(N)−V x¯t(N).
Then
∑
i∈N
αˆi =
∑
i∈N
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) +
∑
i∈N
αti =
= V x0(N)− V x¯t(N) + V x¯t(N) = V x0(N).
Since αt is an imputation in the subgame Γx¯t(N,V x¯t), and
taking into account the strong IBP condition for individual
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players (22) we get
αˆi =
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) + α
t
i = V x0({i})− V x¯t({i}) + αti =
= V x0({i})− V x¯t({i}) + V x¯t({i}) = V x0({i}).
Thus, αˆ is exactly an imputation in the original game
Γ(N,V x0).
Since αt ∈ C(V x¯t), using the strong IBP condition for
coalitions (23) we obtain
∑
i∈S
αˆi =
∑
i∈S
t∑
τ=1
βi(x¯τ ) +
∑
i∈S
αti =
= V x0(S)− V x¯t(S) +
∑
i∈S
αti =
= V x0(S)−V x¯t(S)+V x¯t(S) = V x0(S), ∀S ⊂ N, |S| > 1.
Hence, the resulting vector of the players’ payoffs αˆ despite
of the deviation made in the subgame Γx¯t(N,V x¯t) still
belongs to the core C(V x0) of the original game. 2
It is worth noting that Proposition 4 does not depend on
a particular optimal imputation the players select within
the core given that this imputation and corresponding pay-
ment schedule satisfy the strong IBP conditions (22) and
(23).
Any of the payment schedules introduced in Sec. 5.1
can be used as a supporting imputation distribution pro-
cedure. In this case, one only need to verify whether the
Shapley value belongs to the core at every subgame along
the cooperative path and whether it satisfies the strong
IBP conditions for individual players (22) and for coali-
tions (23).
6. Example. Implementation of three payment
schedules for given multicriteria game
Consider 3-person game with 3 criteria: n = 3, r = 3,
P1 = {x0}, P2 = {x1}, P3 = {x2}, P4 = {x3, x4, x5, x6},
and
h(xt) =
 h1/1(xt) h2/1(xt) h3/1(xt)h1/2(xt) h2/2(xt) h3/2(xt)
h1/3(xt) h2/3(xt) h3/3(xt)
 .
The game dynamics and payoffs are presented in Fig. 2.
x0 x1 x2 x3
x4 x5 x6 12 12 66 6 6
6 6 12

 6 12 612 12 12
6 6 6

 6 12 618 18 18
12 6 12

 6 12 612 6 6
12 12 12

 6 6 126 6 6
6 6 12

 6 6 66 18 12
6 6 6

Figure 2: The 3-criteria game tree
There exist two Pareto optimal trajectories in this game.
Using the MSRD rule the players choose the optimal co-
operative strategy profile u¯ = (u¯1, u¯2, u¯3): u¯1(x0) = x1,
u¯2(x1) = x2, u¯3(x2) = x3; which generates the coopera-
tive trajectory ω¯ = ω(u¯) = (x0, x1, x2, x3)=(x¯0, x¯1, x¯2, x¯3).
The values of the vector-valued ζ – characteristic function
(12) for the game Γx0 are
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
V x0(S) 12 12 6 48 24 18 66
30 6 6 54 60 12 96
18 6 12 48 36 18 72
and the Shapley value for original game Γx0 is
ϕx0 =
 29 26 1155 19 22
35 20 17
 .
The vector-valued ζ – characteristic functions and the re-
spective Shapley values for the subgames along the cooper-
ative path ω¯ can be constructed using the same approach
(12).
The subgame Γx1(N,V x1):
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
V x1(S) 6 18 6 30 12 30 42
18 12 18 30 36 42 60
12 18 12 36 24 36 54
ϕx1 =
 9 24 918 18 24
15 24 15
 .
The subgame Γx2(N,V x2):
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} N
V x2(S) 6 6 6 12 12 12 18
6 6 12 12 18 30 36
6 6 6 12 12 12 18
ϕx2 =
 6 6 66 12 18
6 6 6
 .
One can readily check that the Shapley value satisfies (27)
for the original game and for both subgames along the
optimal cooperative path, i.e., ϕx¯t ∈ C(V x¯t), t = 0, 1, 2.
Therefore, the core C(V x¯t) is nonempty ∀t = 0, 1, 2. The
simplest incremental imputation distribution procedure
(24)
{βi/k(x¯1)} = ϕx¯0 − ϕx¯1 =
 20 2 237 1 −2
20 −4 2
 ,
{βi/k(x¯2)}=
 3 18 312 6 6
9 18 9
, {βi/k(x¯3)}=
 6 6 66 12 18
6 6 6

and the proportional payment schedule (25)
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{β˜i/k(x¯1)} =
 10, (54) 9, (45) 420, 625 7, 125 8, 25
8, 75 5 4, 25
 ,
{β˜i/k(x¯2)}=
 10, (54) 9, (45) 413, 75 4, 75 5, 5
17, 5 10 8, 5
,
{β˜i/k(x¯3)}=
 7, (90) 7, (09) 320, 625 7, 125 8, 25
8, 75 5 4, 25

satisfy the strong IBP conditions for individual players
(22) and for coalitions (23) for all t = 1, 2. Therefore,
the whole core C(V x0) satisfies the STC, and the Shapley
value ϕx0 can be employed as a supporting optimal impu-
tation while the players use either the incremental impu-
tation distribution procedure (24) or the proportional IDP
(25). The choice of one of the two payment schedules can
be made taking into account which of the two properties -
time consistency or non-negativity - is more important for
the players.
On the other hand, the V-incremental payment schedule
(26)
{˜˜βi/k(x¯1)} =
 14 2 826 8 2
14 −4 8
 ,
{˜˜βi/k(x¯2)}=
 4 16 412 6 6
10 16 10
, {˜˜βi/k(x¯3)}=
 11 8 −117 5 14
11 8 −1

does not satisfy the strong IBP condition for coalitions for
t = 1 (since condition (23) is violated for coalition S =
{1, 2}). Therefore, in this game, V-incremental payment
schedule does not ensure the sustainability of a long-term
cooperative agreement and cannot be used as a supporting
IDP.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a new rule that can be
used to choose an optimal and time consistent cooperative
trajectory in a multicriteria multistage game. This rule
can be used for a wide class of multicriteria games with
positive payoffs to construct a vector-valued characteristic
function that satisfies weak superadditivity property. The
players are assumed to use the payment schedule based
approach to guarantee the sustainability of a cooperative
agreement, i.e. the players design an appropriate alloca-
tion mechanism in order to distribute the optimal payoff
of each player along the cooperative trajectory.
Furthermore, we specify the minimal set of properties a
payment schedule should satisfy to guarantee the STC of
the whole core. Namely, if the payment schedule designed
to distribute the Shapley value satisfies strict balance con-
dition, efficiency condition and the strong IBP conditions,
given that the Shapley value belongs to the core, it can be
employed as a supporting imputation distribution proce-
dure. The STC of the core implyes that a single deviation
from the Shapley value to any other imputation chosen
from the subgame core still lead to the payments vector
from the core of the original multistage game. We discuss
three payment schedules - the incremental, proportional
and V-incremental IDP - and check whether they can be
used as supporting imputation distribution procedures for
the given multicriteria game.
An interesting research question is to provide an ax-
iomatic characterization (see, [42, 36]) of the proposed
MSRD rule for choosing a unique Pareto efficient solution
in multicriteria games.
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